Violence in a Changing Political Context: Northern Ireland and South Africa by Knox, Colin & Monaghan, Rachel
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Violence in a Changing Political Context: 
Northern Ireland and South Africa
1
 
Colin Knox and Rachel Monaghan – University of Ulster 
 
In E. Stanko (ed) The Meanings of Violence, London Routledge, 2003: 184-202 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact details: 
Colin Knox and Rachel Monaghan 
School of Policy Studies 
University of Ulster 
Newtownabbey 
Northern Ireland 
BT 37 OQB 
Telephone: 028 90366378/90366667 
Email: cg.knox@ulster.ac.uk 
Fax: 028 90366847 
 
18
th
 March 2002 
 
                                                          
1
 The authors wish to acknowledge the support of ESRC funding (grant L133251003) in carrying out 
the work for this chapter and research assistance of Dermot Feenan in the early stages of the project. 
2  
Introduction 
Northern Ireland and South Africa are moving from conflict to post-conflict societies. 
Both countries have new political dispensations and seek to eschew the legacy of 
bitter and bloody violence. The history of the political struggles has, however, 
embedded a culture tolerant of violence characterised by descriptions such as ‘an 
acceptable level of violence’ or ‘an imperfect peace’. Somehow the threshold of 
violence is different/higher in these countries because of their transitional status.  
 
This chapter will therefore explore how the meaning of violence is inextricably linked 
to the political context in Northern Ireland and South Africa. Specifically it will 
examine the continuing role of violence meted out by paramilitary/vigilante groups to 
alleged wrongdoers within the communities in which they operate, the stranglehold 
these groups exert and how, if at all, this is changing. The role played by the police 
and the criminal justice systems will also be discussed within the new era of 
established political systems that have replaced ‘white rule’ and ‘direct rule’ in South 
Africa and Northern Ireland respectively. 
 
Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland has entered a new political era. The Belfast Agreement of April 1998 
heralded the end of a political, constitutional and security crisis lasting almost 30 
years. Its signatories reaffirmed their ‘total and absolute commitment to exclusively 
democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues’ and their 
‘opposition to any threat of force by others for any political purpose’ (Belfast 
Agreement: 1998: 1 section 4).  The Agreement between political parties however did 
not, of itself, change the course of violent activity on the ground. In 1999/00, for 
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example, the number of deaths due to the security situation fell from 44 in the 
previous year to a low of seven. This increased to 18 deaths in 2000/01, all of which 
were civilians. There has also been a substantial rise in the recorded number of 
security-related shooting incidents from 131 in 1999/00 to 331 in 2000/01. The 
number of casualties as a result of paramilitary-style attacks rose from 178 to 323 in 
the same year (RUC Chief Constable’s Report 2000-2001). All this in an era of cease-
fires, peace and political agreement.  
 
Whilst not oblivious to the ongoing and in some areas increasing violence, the 
Government rationalises this as ‘an imperfect peace’, or what former Secretary of 
State Mo Mowlam described as ‘an acceptable level of violence’.  Quite how 
‘acceptable’ is defined is unclear, but the notion that a society riven with violent 
conflict can be more tolerant of murder, shootings and bombings is the implication of 
this description which can become self-fulfilling and encourage acquiescence in the 
status quo.  Instead, the Government argues that their role is to create the political 
context in which violence becomes a thing of the past and the aims of paramilitary 
groups have been superseded by political progress. The British Government has 
attempted to do this in several ways.  
 First, by securing the political institutions which are the democratic core of the 
Belfast Agreement - devolved government through the Northern Ireland Assembly 
and the Executive.  
 Second, the implementation of the Patten Report on police reforms including the 
introduction of legislation to amend the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 and 
reflect more fully Patten’s recommendations.  
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 Third, the implementation of the Criminal Justice Review so that the criminal 
justice system has the confidence of all parts of the community and delivers 
justice efficiently and effectively through a fair and impartial system which 
encourages community involvement, where appropriate.  
 Fourth, a progressive rolling programme reducing levels of troops and military 
installations, as the security situation improves.  
 And finally, further progress in implementing the Agreement’s provisions on 
human rights and equality.  
 
In practice, the Government’s ability to deliver democratic stability has made faltering 
progress. The on-off nature of devolution (through suspensions of the institutions) 
demonstrates the fragility of the peace process and how contingent it is on the 
resolution of issues such as policing, decommissioning and demilitarisation. Some 
Unionists, for example, are challenging historic moves by the IRA in putting a 
quantity of weaponry verifiable beyond use, as insufficient. The establishment of a 
new Police Service of Northern Ireland (replacing the RUC from November 2001) 
accountable to a Policing Board has not secured the agreement of Sinn Féin. Stable 
governance is far from secure. Dr. John Reid (Northern Ireland Secretary of State) 
declared: 
 
We are on a journey from violence to democracy. For those who are making 
that change from violence to politics, including Republicans, we have shown 
patience. We don’t underestimate how far they have come. We understand the 
historical and ideological enormity of that challenge. But ultimately we all 
face a stark choice. The ballot box, or bomb and the bullet. There is no 
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mix‘n’match in a democracy (Secretary of State’s Speech to Labour Party 
Conference: 3 October 2001). 
 
The research in this chapter would however contend that there is in fact a 
‘mix‘n’match’ in the democracy that is Northern Ireland but the Government simply 
chooses to ignore it in the interests of what they perceive as the broader collective 
good of securing a long term political settlement. In other words the meaning of, and 
tolerance towards, violence is inextricably linked to the political context of Northern 
Ireland. The most obvious manifestation of the parallel tracks of violence and 
democracy are paramilitary-style attacks or so-called ‘punishment’ beatings and 
shootings which in 2000/01 are at an all time high since figures for such attacks were 
recorded. We examine these in some detail. 
 
South Africa 
South Africa similarly has emerged from a bitter ethno-national conflict in which 
violence and crime characterised the transition to a peaceful political settlement. The 
collapse of apartheid in 1989, lifting the 30-year ban on the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela, created a climate for 
political negotiation and change in South Africa. This paved the way for an interim 
constitution, the first multi-racial democratic elections in 1994 and led to the 
Government of National Unity. The ANC’s success in the June 1999 elections gave 
the party an overwhelming mandate to accelerate Thabo Mbeki’s programme of 
‘transformation’ aimed at tackling the significant socio-economic problems facing 
South Africa: unemployment, AIDS, crime and education. The legacy of political 
resistance, often violent, deployed to make the townships ungovernable during 
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apartheid has created a culture tolerant of citizens taking the law into their own hands. 
Although the number of political killings dropped sharply from about 2,500 in 1994 to 
fewer than 240 in 1999 (South African Institute for Race Relations, 2000), Mbeki in 
his inauguration speech regretted that some South Africans were ‘forced to beg, rob 
and murder to ensure that they and their own do not perish from hunger’. This is 
reflected in a rising tide of other kinds of violent crimes. Rape, car-jacking, serious 
assault, housebreaking and common robbery, have been increasing since 1996, and 
the trend has been sharply upwards since 1998. About a third of all reported violent 
crimes in 1999 were violent, and the number increased by over 9% on 1998. The 
savagery of the crime wave is captured in reports that one in every two South African 
women will be raped during their lifetime, the average South African is eight times 
more likely to be murdered than the average American, and one policeman is killed 
each day - 1,400 have died since the ANC came to power. Accordingly, the public 
response is that ‘brutality should be met with brutality. The rich surround themselves 
with razor wire and private security guards, and the poor resort to vigilantism’ (The 
Economist, 1999: 23).  
 
Given the rising levels of crime, politicians, judges and township residents alike have 
begun calling for the reintroduction of the death penalty and corporal punishment. 
Indeed, the Pan Africanist Congress president Bishop Stanley Mogoba called for 
criminals to have their limbs chopped off: ‘It is our view that we must start taking the 
war to criminals and if it means we have to use the method of dismembering them, we 
will do it’ (Quoted in Lekota, 1999: 3). More recently, senior provincial government 
ministers in KwaZulu-Natal have called for the castration of rapists and the return of 
the death penalty for serious crimes such as murder. 
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What these accounts illustrate is that there is a disjuncture between political 
settlements in Northern Ireland and South Africa and the transition to peaceful 
democracies at grassroots level. This is perhaps unsurprising given that ‘political 
struggles’ in both countries have involved the use of violence to achieve constitutional 
change. When political objectives have been met, there is a blurring of the boundaries 
between political acts of violence and criminality. In both countries a sharp decline in 
political violence has given way to a surge in non-political organised crime, utilising 
similar violent methods. We now consider two particular forms of violence prevalent 
within the changing political contexts of Northern Ireland and South Africa – 
paramilitary style attacks and vigilante activity, respectively. 
 
Intra-Community Violence 
Paramilitary-style attacks 
The informal or alternative criminal justice system has evolved in its current form 
since the beginnings of ‘the Troubles’ (1968) in Northern Ireland2. This system 
involves a graduated series of ‘punishments’ carried out by paramilitaries to include 
threats or warnings, public humiliation, curfew, exile, beating or shooting and, in 
exceptional circumstances, ‘execution’ (Thompson and Mulholland, 1995). In theory, 
the more serious the ‘crime’ the more severe the penalty imposed – a crude tariff 
system is in place (Silke, 1998). In practice, ‘being connected’ though kinship or 
friendship to the paramilitary hierarchy can be used in mitigation or to evade 
‘punishment’. Kennedy (1995: 69) describes the system as a range of punitive 
                                                          
2
 Informal justice systems have historical antecedents in Ireland associated with revolutionary agrarian 
societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who were concerned with protecting tenants, 
labourers and small holders who worked on the land from arbitrary acts by landholders. See for 
example Monaghan, 2002 and Alter, 1982. 
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measures against individuals ‘who violate some community norm, as defined by the 
paramilitary grouping’.  Typically this includes petty criminals allegedly involved in 
burglary, car theft and joy riding, vandalism, muggings and more serious accusations 
against drug dealers and paedophiles. ‘Punishment’ is inflicted through baseball bats 
spiked with nails, hammers or power tools used on bones. Assaults are aimed directly 
at bones to cause multiple fractures, shots are directed at the elbows or hands and 
knees/ankles to exact maximum damage.  This crude emulation of the formal criminal 
justice system ignores due process and shows contempt for the human rights of those 
who stand accused. Hence there are cases of mistaken identity, attacks on children as 
young as 13 years old, and personal grudges over money, personal relationships, and 
control of drug territory, masquerading as paramilitaries protecting their communities. 
 
Figure 1: Paramilitary-style Attacks
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Source: Police Service of Northern Ireland 
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According to police statistics between 1973 and the end of 2001 there have been 
2,563 paramilitary ‘punishment’ shootings (an average of 88 per year) of which 45% 
have been perpetrated by loyalists and 55% by republicans. From 1982 to the end of 
2001 there have been 1,822 beatings (an average of 91 per year), 47% of which have 
been carried out by loyalists and 53% by republicans. Statistics on paramilitary-style 
attacks were not collated before 1973 in the case of shootings and 1982 for beatings, 
and police admit that official figures are thought to under-estimate the true extent of 
the problem by as much as 30-50% because victims are reluctant to report incidents 
for fear of paramilitary reprisal.  
 
The figures show there was a significant increase in beatings and concomitant 
decrease in shootings following the cease-fires of August and October 1994
3
. This 
reflected moves by paramilitaries not to implicate their political representatives in 
claims that their cease-fires had broken down, particularly on the republican side with 
their public avowals of non-violent alternatives. Since 1996 beatings have decreased 
but still remain higher than pre-cease fire levels, and shootings are escalating year-on-
year. In short, the situation is getting worse. There is no information available of 
charges brought against perpetrators. Offenders are charged with crimes such as 
common assault, grievous bodily harm and actual bodily harm, hence it is impossible 
to ascertain successful police prosecutions. The Chief Constable of the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland has confirmed that the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) all of which 
                                                          
3
 The IRA ended its cease-fire on 9 February 1996 with the Canary Wharf bombing and restored it on 
19 July 1997. 
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have declared cease-fires are behind many of these attacks
4
. He highlighted the 
distinction that they make between ‘a cessation of military operations and some 
distorted view that this sort of barbarity doesn’t come within these terms’ (MacKay 
citing Chief Constable, 1999: 351). In October 2001 the Government concluded, in 
the wake of violence in the North Belfast area that the UDA, Ulster Freedom Fighters 
(UFF) and LVF were no longer maintaining their cease-fires and specified these 
organisations
5
. The central role played by paramilitaries in these attacks is cynically 
demonstrated by their complete cessation (on the republican side) during the Clinton 
visits to Northern Ireland in 1994 and 1998 and the Mitchell review on the 
implementation of the Belfast Agreement in November 1999.  
 
Vigilante attacks 
Likewise in South Africa, alternative forms of justice can be found in the black 
townships. During the apartheid years township inhabitants developed informal 
criminal justice mechanisms for dealing with crime in their community. These 
mechanisms were developed, in part, from traditional rural practices such as the 
lekgotla
6
, which emphasised the restoration of harmony and the re-integration of 
                                                          
4
 The UVF is a loyalist paramilitary group that was formed in 1966. They have been responsible for a 
large number of assassinations, mostly innocent Catholics, in Northern Ireland. The UVF became part 
of the Combined Loyalist Military Command in 1991. In 1996 a number of disaffected ‘maverick’ 
members broke away to form the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). The UDA was, and remains, the 
largest loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland. It was formed in 1971 from a number of loyalist 
vigilante groups, many of which were called ‘defence associations’ - one such group was the Shankill 
Defence Association. Members of the UDA have, since 1973, used the cover name of the Ulster 
Freedom Fighters (UFF) to claim the responsibility for the killing of Catholics. The Ulster Democratic 
Party which earned a place at the multi-party talks following the Forum elections in May 1996 
represented the UDA until November 2001 but has since dissolved as a political party over 
disagreements about the UDA’s lack of support for the Belfast Agreement. 
5
 The result of specification includes measures such as early releases prisoners associated with the 
UDA, UFF and LVF can now have their licences suspended and be returned to jail if they are believed 
to continue to support their organisation. Any UDA, UFF or LVF person found guilty of a scheduled 
offence that took place before the Belfast Agreement cannot qualify for early release provisions. The 
Real IRA, Continuity IRA, Red Hand Defenders and Orange Volunteers are already specified. 
6
 The lekgotla is a court comprised of elders of the community who convene a meeting to listen to 
disputes and problems within the community and pass judgement. The lekgotla emphasise a 
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offenders into the community. Sentences handed down to those found guilty included 
fines, corporal punishment and community service. Neighbourhood patrols and street 
committees were also established in an attempt to deal with ‘normal’ crime, for 
instance robbery, theft and rape. With the emergence of the politicised youth or 
‘comrades’, people’s courts were established within the townships and residents were 
encouraged to take their problems to the ‘comrades’. These courts were seen as part 
of the political struggle against apartheid as they represented an alternative to the state 
structure and dealt with both ‘normal’ and ‘political’ crime. Gradually these courts, 
which numbered some 400 by 1987, began to acquire the reputation of ‘kangaroo 
courts’ (Brogden and Shearing, 1993; Minnaar, 1995). Such courts are characterised 
by their predetermined assumption of guilt of the accused, instant redress and often 
engaged in human rights abuses. The people’s courts of the ‘comrades’ in some cases 
meted out beatings and whippings with a sjambok, with sentences of up to 300 lashes 
and on occasions a death sentence was passed. By the mid-1980s, those individuals 
accused of ‘political’ crimes such as collaboration, informing or being a ‘sell-out’ 
(working as a councillor or a police officer) were ‘necklaced’ for their alleged crimes. 
The necklace method involves the placing of a petrol-filled tyre around the accused’s 
neck that is then set alight. Estimates suggest that between 1985 and 1990 some 350 
to 400 people were killed by this method of execution with a further 500 necklaced 
between 1990 and 1994 (Minnaar, 1995). 
 
The advent of a negotiated settlement to the political conflict and the holding of multi-
racial elections have not resulted in the disappearance of retributive informal justice in 
the ‘new’ South Africa. The ‘comrades’ are no longer involved in such justice, rather 
                                                                                                                                                                      
conservative moral code including respect for elders, the importance of kin and patriarchal authority. 
The plural of lekgotla is makgotla. 
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new groups have emerged, these include the Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency (PEACA)
7
 
in the Western Cape, Mapogo a Mathamaga
8
 (hereafter referred to as Mapogo) in the 
Northern Province and the willingness of taxi associations in some townships to 
become involved in crime solving for a fee. All of these groups stand accused of using 
corporal punishment and violence in responding to crime. Indeed Mapogo’s leader, 
John Magolego asserts that public flogging, ‘is the African way of stopping crime. The 
criminal must lie on the ground, and we must work on his buttocks and put him right’ 
(Cited in Soggot and Ngobeni, 1999). Alleged suspects are usually beaten until they 
confess or provide information as to the whereabouts of stolen goods.  Mapogo has 
also been accused of throwing suspects into crocodile-infested waters, while taxi-
drivers in Guguletu are implicated in dragging alleged criminals behind vehicles.  
 
Furthermore, in some cases spontaneous mobs form to mete out justice to alleged 
criminals. In some instances, those present convene kangaroo courts but this is not 
always the case. The justice meted out is often of an extremely brutal nature and 
deaths are common. Examples in the townships include the stoning to death of a 
motorist after he had run over and killed a two-year-old child in Carletonville (South 
African Press Association, 1999); the necklacing of four immigrants accused of 
gangsterism in Ivory Park (Midrand) (Reuters, 1999) and the beating to death of a 
suspected thief in Philippi East just outside Cape Town (Le May, 2001). In some 
cases members of a suspected criminal’s family or the family home are targeted. Their 
houses are either destroyed or burnt and often the families subsequently leave the area 
as a result of intimidation. In February 1997, the mother of an alleged criminal was 
                                                          
7
 PEACA is based in Khayelitsha, a township near Cape Town. It was formed in August 1998 by ex-
combatants of the liberation struggle and local residents who had come together to fight crime. Its 
members number some 1,500. 
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stoned to death for the deeds of her son by a crowd of 4,000 in the township of 
Mamelodi, near Pretoria (Amupadhi, 1997).  
 
Community condonation 
Northern Ireland 
Paramilitaries claim to be responding to popular pressure from within their 
communities for instant retributive justice.  This is borne out by Cavanaugh (1997) in 
an ethnographic study undertaken within both communities in Belfast where she 
posits the community, not as a passive entity but integral to the analysis of political 
violence in Northern Ireland. She suggests civil society in Northern Ireland is 
characterised by a strong sense of community, ethnic separation, and tradition of 
loyalism and republican in both its cultural and political forms. ‘With basic security 
needs left unfulfilled and fear of identity loss prevalent in both republican and loyalist 
communities, strong intra-communal infrastructures have evolved which protect and 
promote community cohesion’ (Cavanaugh, 1997: 46). This strong community 
cohesion, she argues, demands social order and control constructed through 
‘alternative legalities to that of the state’.  As Northern Ireland becomes more 
polarised and segregated housing increases as a result of people feel more secure 
‘living amongst their own’, so too do the demands for social order. 
 
That social order is exercised through paramilitaries and communities argue that the 
need for their involvement exists for three principal reasons. First, particularly in 
republican areas, there is an absence of an adequate policing service. The RUC (now 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland: PSNI) has no legitimacy amongst republicans, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8
 Mapogo a Mathamaga was established in August 1996 and has some 50,000 members who pay a 
monthly subscription to the organisation in return for protection against crime. 
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and their communities would not normally involve the police in dealing with crimes 
in their areas. Republicans claim that the PSNI are prepared to tolerate at best, or 
encourage at worst, crime in their communities as a way of undermining 
republicanism. Police are therefore willing to trade dropping charges for petty crime 
in return for low-level intelligence gathering. In loyalist areas where the RUC, given 
its composition, was once seen as ‘their’ police force, things have changed. Political 
developments have eroded Protestants’ monopoly grasp on the state and its organs, 
creating a real sense of alienation. Police tactics, for example, in upholding the rights 
of Catholic parents to walk to school through loyalist areas in North Belfast (the Holy 
Cross dispute
9
) have reinforced antagonism towards the police. Loyalists want to keep 
the PSNI out of communities where drug dealing, racketeering and illegal drinking 
dens are clubs are commonplace. Second, there is a rising level of ‘anti-social 
behaviour’ and petty crime, particularly in working-class areas. From police statistics 
the levels of recorded crime, of which common assault and criminal damage account 
for about one third, have been increasing (Police Authority, 2001: 53). In the absence, 
therefore, of a legitimate police force and/or because people are discouraged from 
seeking PSNI intervention, communities turn to the paramilitaries to secure a prompt, 
visible and, in their view, effective response to crime in their areas. Third, the formal 
criminal justice system within these communities is perceived as slow, ineffectual and 
soft on crime. In a society where violent conflict has been the norm for over 30 years, 
it isn’t surprising that the time taken to process offenders, the necessary safeguards in 
                                                          
9
 A picket was set up in June 2001 to protest against Catholic children, who attended the Holy Cross 
Primary School, walking through a Protestant estate in the Ardoyne area of Belfast. Ugly scenes of 
sectarian chants and taunts by Protestants aimed at the school children and their parents were broadcast 
around the world. North Belfast was once a unionist stronghold with a low-income Catholic minority. 
The demography has changed with the flight of middle-class unionists from the area. Protestants now 
see themselves as a besieged minority and react with anger to what they perceive as increasing 
territorialism by Catholics. 
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the legal system, and the standard of proof required for conviction is seen as no match 
for summary justice meted out by paramilitaries.  
 
Working-class communities in Northern Ireland that have been brutalised during the 
conflict have become desensitised to violent crime. Victims of crime reporting to 
paramilitaries almost certainly know the consequences of their actions for the alleged 
perpetrator. In a country which has witnessed over 3,600 deaths and numerous serious 
injuries, the emphasis is more on revenge than justice (McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney 
and Thornton, 1999). The nature of the conflict and roles played by the key 
protagonists is important in understanding the response to community crime. When 
the legitimacy of the State and effectiveness and impartiality of its organs (security 
forces and legal system) are integral to the conflict, this forecloses recourse to the 
normal channels by which communities seek to tackle crime (Ní Aoláin, 2000; 
Rolston, 2000). Hence communities develop their own responses to crime through 
informal justice mechanisms which will be significantly influenced by the violent 
environment within which they live. As one communitarian suggested ‘if you have a 
gripe with someone, the way to resolve it is to hit them a dig on the gob, if it was 
bigger than that, pull the paramilitaries in’ (interview with loyalist community 
worker, 2000). All of this suggests that the meaning of violence in Northern Ireland 
and the community response to it, is closely bound to the political milieu within 
which it takes place. Given this argument, it is obvious that attempts to tackle the 
informal criminal justice system have been politically laden. Similar community 
support/endorsement for informal ‘justice’ is also evident in South Africa. 
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South Africa 
Vigilantes and vigilante groups such as Mapogo and PEACA argue their activities, 
aimed at combating crime and maintaining ‘law and order’, are a direct response to 
community demands for action to be taken against criminals. Both groups point to 
continued community support and membership of their organisations as evidence of 
this. Indeed, people queue on a daily basis outside PEACA’s offices in Khayelitsha, 
and Mapogo’s supporters/members display the organisation’s symbol in their homes, 
shops, businesses and cars as a warning to criminals not to target them. In addition to 
its crime-solving activities, Mapogo has moved into the area of crime prevention by 
offering services usually provided by private security firms such as the protection of 
property and patrolling; takers have included schools and churches. 
 
Like Northern Ireland, a number of principal reasons are cited by communities for the 
continued existence of the informal criminal justice system in the ‘new’ South Africa. 
Firstly, although the South African Police Service (SAPS) is now regarded as the 
legitimate police service of the government, it is widely seen as being ineffective. 
According to recent research conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (cited in 
Meyer, 2001), ‘crime pays in South Africa’ as the majority of criminals never get 
caught and, of those who are arrested, a mere 8% spend any time in jail. Of the 2.58 
million cases that were reported to and/or recorded by the police in the year 2000, 
only 610,000 went to court and, of these only 210,000 ended in a conviction. 
Secondly, the formal criminal justice system is viewed as ineffectual, slow and soft on 
criminals. As one township resident explained: ‘The law takes it very easy [on 
criminals] and the person gets out of jail easily’ (community focus group participant, 
Khayelitsha, November 1999). Although mandatory minimum sentences for certain 
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offences and tough bail laws have been introduced, this has not countered criticism 
levelled against the judiciary. Rape, for example, now carries a life sentence where 
the victim is raped more than once, is seriously assaulted, or is under the age of 16 
years. Lesser sentences may be imposed if ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances 
exist. In October 1999, Judge Foxcroft handed down a seven-year sentence to a man 
found guilty of raping his 14-year-old daughter. In his judgement, Foxcroft stated this 
was ‘not one of the worst cases of rape’ and that the man’s ‘sexual deviancy’ was 
limited to the accused’s own daughter (see Smith, 1999 and South African Press 
Association, 2001 for more details). Such sentencing rationale does not inspire 
confidence in those communities most affected by crime and sends a message to the 
community. As Bronwyn Pithey, a Rape Crisis legal adviser explains: ‘One can 
empathise with people who take the law into their own hands. With the Foxcroft 
judgment it is no surprise that people are acting like this’ (Abarber, 1999). In contrast, 
informal justice is quick and ‘punishes’ offenders there and then and in some cases 
stolen goods and monies are returned to their rightful owner/s. More often, alleged 
suspects are killed or end up in hospital in a critical condition. In a recent incident in a 
township in Cape Town, a mob began stoning a suspect in full view of the police. The 
police fired warning shots into the air, however, the crowd refused to disperse and 
threatened the police and ambulance staff (Le May, 2001).  
 
Indeed, commentators note ‘as was the case with the conservative vigilantes of the 
apartheid era, it appears that those involved in vigilante action today are most unlikely 
to face legal consequences for their actions’ (Bruce and Komane, 1999: 41). Victims 
of vigilante attacks are reluctant to lay charges against their attackers. For example, a 
16-year-old youth suspected of house breaking was assaulted by three men in 
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Vredehoek (Cape Town), although the attackers were known to the police, the youth 
declined to make a complaint against them (Kemp, 2001). Since its inception, at least 
20 people are thought to have been killed by Mapogo, although none of those initially 
charged have been convicted (Tromp and Gophe, 2001). Although 607 members of 
the group have been arrested between 1996 and 2000 and charged with a range of 
other offences including kidnapping, assault and attempted murder, only 14 members 
have been convicted of an offence (for more details see Sekhonyane, 2000). In August 
2000, Mapogo’s leader Magolego and 11 other members were cleared of murder and 
assault charges because witnesses were too frightened to testify against them. What 
then has been the response to dealing with communal violence associated with 
paramilitaries and vigilantes ‘protecting’ their communities against criminality? 
 
The politics of resolution 
Northern Ireland 
Several examples illustrate how seeking to tackle paramilitary-style attacks has 
clashed with the ‘high’ politics of Northern Ireland. The response of statutory 
organisations to these attacks has been one of minimisation and indifference to the 
problem, or what Conway has described as ‘reactive containment’ (Conway, 1997: 
114). The police argue that many of the victims refuse to make a witness statement for 
fear of reprisals and that in the absence of forensic evidence or catching paramilitaries 
in the act, they have little chance of apprehending the perpetrators. However, 
participants in this research claimed that, whilst not openly encouraging the informal 
justice system, the police recognise its existence and perpetrate its use by referring 
some complainants to the paramilitaries. Their motives for so doing may be no more 
sinister than accepting that the informal system in particular circumstances such as a 
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burglary may be more effective at retrieving stolen goods than the formal police and 
legal systems. At best, therefore, the police acquiesce in the status quo. The Northern 
Ireland Office’s (NIO) response, which has responsibility for law and order, is to see 
paramilitary-style attacks more within the framework of crime prevention and 
community safety which seek to address the causes of anti-social behaviour. They do 
not commit resources directly to the problem and their interest in it appears to peak 
only when it is linked to the political agenda of the day. Hence when there was a 
parliamentary debate on informal ‘justice’10 initiated by the Conservative Party in an 
attempt to halt the early release of political prisoners under the terms of the Belfast 
Agreement, the Northern Ireland Office suddenly became interested in the research of 
the authors. 
 
Moreover, criticism by the researchers of the lack of response by statutory agencies to 
paramilitary-style attacks met with a political rebuttal. The Northern Ireland Office, 
stung by accusations that the Government was adopting a ‘see no evil, hear no evil’ 
stance to ongoing beatings and shootings, responded with a statement denying its 
indifference and attacking the research findings (Knox, 2002). They claimed the 
research represented ‘a series of unsubstantiated, generalised and politically 
tendentious assertions and successive Northern Secretaries and Security Ministers had 
consistently condemned the attacks and had called for those with influence to end 
them’ (Breen, 2000). The statement was issued before the NIO asked for a copy of the 
research report from the authors! The research also became the subject of a Northern 
Ireland Assembly debate with pro- and anti-Belfast Agreement politicians adopting 
positions on its findings. One pro-Agreement parties argued that the report 
                                                          
10
 House of Commons Debate 27 January 1999 Terrorist Mutilations (Northern Ireland): 347-398. 
Hansard 
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‘highlighted the strong support that there is for alternatives to ‘punishment’ attacks 
(such as restorative justice) in the absence of a legitimate policing service’ 
(Gildernew, 2001: 31). Anti-Agreement parties claimed that paramilitary attacks had 
soared as a direct result of prisoner releases and the research ‘presented cogent 
evidence that the Good Friday Agreement is failing’ (Paisley, 2001: 47).  
Politicisation is an ongoing feature of the debate on this issue. The Sinn Féin Health 
Minister, Bairbre de Brún, is regularly asked for information in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly on how the immediate hospitalisation of those subject to beatings and 
shootings is displacing patients on long waiting lists in need of orthopaedic surgery 
and trauma counselling. This is as much to embarrass and undermine the Sinn Féin 
Minister as it is to highlight the plight of paramilitary victims. 
 
All political parties publicly call for an end to paramilitary-style attacks yet, given 
their lack of influence with paramilitaries, it is left to parties such as Sinn Féin and the 
Progressive Unionist Party to directly tackle the problem. They, in turn, are fighting 
against a history of summary justice within the areas they represent. Both have 
attempted to introduce and/or support alternative mechanisms for dealing with 
community crime. On the republican side, a number of community restorative justice 
projects have been set up as a means of addressing anti-social behaviour through 
mediated agreement, work with families, restitution, payment of damages, referral to 
a programme or statutory agency and community service (Auld et al, 1997). On the 
loyalist side, the Greater Shankill Alternatives Programme has piloted a restorative 
justice approach which features offender/victim mediation, community service work 
for individuals under threat from paramilitaries, and intensive training and peer 
education groups focused on behavioural problems (Winston, 1997). Reactions to 
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these schemes have been, at best, mixed and, at worst, dismissive. This is particularly 
true of republican initiatives which exclude police involvement in the implementation 
of their programmes. The most recent Government proposals for community 
restorative justice schemes contained in draft legislation (Justice (Northern Ireland) 
Bill, 2001) emerging from the review of the criminal justice system, suggest referrals 
must come from a statutory criminal justice agency, rather than from within the 
community. The police must be informed of all such referrals and all schemes must be 
accredited and subject to standards (human rights, due process etc.) laid down by the 
Government (Northern Ireland Office, 2001: 79). This is clearly a political and 
criminal justice response to existing community restorative justice schemes, about 
which there are legitimate fears for the rights of the accused and paramilitary 
involvement. It ignores however the legacy of community condonation for summary 
justice and the reality of living in working-class areas controlled by paramilitaries. 
 
South Africa 
Like Northern Ireland, a number of key responses were discernible across the range of 
statutory agencies and NGOs to the problem of vigilante attacks. Firstly, there is 
condemnation of vigilante attacks by government ministers, politicians, NGOs and 
public prosecutors. For example, the current Minster for Safety and Security, Steve 
Tshwete stated ‘we cannot and will not condone any action by vigilante groups as this 
can only contribute to crime. Merely resorting to vigilantism is not only unscrupulous, 
but an abdication of responsibility. Criminals don’t stay on Mars, but in our 
communities’ (Legget, 1999: 8). This view is echoed by police personnel in areas 
where vigilante groups operate and/or mob justice has occurred. In the Western Cape, 
which has seen seven suspected criminals killed in one month by mobs in townships 
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in and around Cape Town, the Provincial Police Commissioner Lennit Max, issued a 
lengthy public statement saying that vigilantes will ‘face the full brunt of the law’. 
The second response identified was that of toleration. On the ground, pockets of 
toleration, and in some cases support, for vigilantism were found within the ranks of 
the South African Police Service (SAPS). Bruce (2001) argues, 
 
Many rank and file members of the SAPS tacitly support vigilante justice, 
while some of them may even overtly encourage it. It is frequently the case 
that, when the police hear a report that an alleged criminal has been 
apprehended and is being assaulted by members of the public, they 
deliberately delay their arrival on the scene. Sometimes this is because they 
wish to avoid the risky task of confronting an angry mob. At other times it is 
because they wish to allow the mob an opportunity to ‘deal with the suspect’ 
first (Bruce, 2001: 1). 
 
Other research has found that some officers were tolerant of vigilantism (Bruce and 
Komane, 1999). This toleration ranged from non-intervention in a situation where an 
alleged criminal was being attacked to openly expressing support for vigilante action 
and failing to take action against individuals involved in vigilantism. The reasons 
given for non-intervention included sympathy with the original victim of crime and a 
lack of confidence in the criminal justice system – a view not confined to community 
members alone. Community members involved in the research also perceived that 
there was police support for vigilante actions in Khayelitsha (Cape Town). 
Furthermore, a number of interviewees suggested that police officers were taking 
cases to PEACA to be dealt with, although an Inspector at the Khayelitsha Police 
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Station denied this. However, he did acknowledge that PEACA had provided accurate 
information concerning stolen vehicles in the area. 
 
Other key responses by agencies to vigilantism can be described as both indifference 
and a disjointed approach to the problem. Historically in South Africa, the 
government has largely neglected victims of political violence and indeed, crime. The 
work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was an attempt to address the 
plight of victims of political violence by piecing together a comprehensive picture of 
the human rights abuses of the apartheid era.  Discussions about what should be done 
for victims of crime, which in theory would include victims of vigilante attacks, 
continue.  
 
Unlike the United Kingdom, systematic victim support services do not exist in South 
Africa. Moreover, there is very little financial support available to victims of crime in 
the form of benefits from the Department of Welfare. Social security benefits are open 
to all South African citizens who meet the eligibility criteria but are very limited in 
terms of financial assistance and the types of benefit offered (see Liebenberg and 
Tilley, 1998 for details). Victims of crime including vigilante attacks are not eligible 
for any special grants or awards and can only apply for those grants already offered. 
At present, no compensation fund exists for victims of crime. Furthermore, there is no 
statutory duty to provide housing in South Africa: ‘There is no provision which 
requires you to be housed by anybody’ (interview with a representative from Black 
Sash
11
, November 1999). Thus, if a person’s house or shack is burnt down as a result 
of a vigilante attack, then that person has no access to state social welfare. 
                                                          
11
 Black Sash is a national NGO which monitors infringements of political and socio-economic rights, 
monitors how the rights of women are affected, engages in paralegal work which strengthens people’s 
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Some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are beginning to offer services to 
victims of crime, those subjected to vigilante attacks are incorporated into the general 
client portfolio. On speaking to a number of NGOs it was difficult to ascertain if any 
victims of vigilante attacks had ever availed of the services on offer or if they had, 
what sort of numbers were involved.  NGOs rely, in part, on donations from domestic 
and international donors in order to carry out their work. Many have found that since 
the establishment of a democratically elected government, international governments 
and funders have donated money directly to government coffers. Subsequently, NGOs 
have felt a financial squeeze and this has affected their ability to run programmes, 
offer services and address issues. Thus, organisations offering support services to 
victims of crime add to the disjointed nature of such service provision. Given the 
precarious nature of NGO funding the long-term needs of victims of crime including 
those who have been attacked by vigilantes, are not being addressed.  
 
Conclusions 
Both the legacy of political violence and the changing constitutional and security 
context significantly condition the meaning of violence in Northern Ireland and South 
Africa. In the case of Northern Ireland, as the State and its organs were (are) pivotal 
stakeholders in the cause and resolution of the conflict, they crucially have an 
important role to play in defining the parameters of what is ‘an acceptable level of 
violence’ within the context of ‘an imperfect peace’. The boundaries are determined 
by the wider political agenda of the British Government and its search for a lasting 
settlement to the Northern Ireland conflict. This has resulted in their resignation, or at 
                                                                                                                                                                      
capacity to understand and claim their rights and campaigns for justice in legislation and state 
administration. 
25  
the very least quiet indifference, to paramilitary-style attacks that would simply be 
unacceptable in other parts of the United Kingdom. This happens in the interests of a 
wider collective good – long term peace. When violent acts become part of the 
political equation, the Government through its response has defined that such beatings 
and shootings do not constitute a breach of the principles of democracy and non-
violence, core tenets of the Belfast Agreement. It is noteworthy that the most recent 
proposals on the full implementation of the Agreement involving the British and Irish 
Governments (the Weston Park discussions) make no mention of the worsening 
problem of paramilitary shootings or ways of tackling this problem. It must therefore 
be concluded that these shootings and beatings come within the purview of ‘an 
acceptable level of violence’ and, whilst distasteful for the Government, little can be 
done to address the problem other than condemnation. More worrying are the reasons 
why communities condone these attacks and subscribe to the paramilitary ‘policing’. 
The lack of confidence in the police and formal criminal justice systems has not been 
adequately addressed from their perspective. Sinn Féin has not endorsed the new 
Police Service of Northern Ireland and refuses to take their seats on the new oversight 
Policing Board. Similarly, the response by the criminal justice review process to 
community-led restorative justice projects has been so heavy-handed that few could 
comply with the formal requirements contained therein. All of this adds up to the 
pessimistic prospect of a continuing role for paramilitaries in meting out their own 
form of summary justice. 
 
In South Africa when discussing community support and/or utilisation of violence 
directed at criminal elements within their own community, it is important to 
remember that recourse to violent action outside the formal institutions of the state is 
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a well-established principle. Indeed a ‘culture of violence’ can be said to exist in 
which society endorses and accepts violence as an acceptable and legitimate means to 
resolve not only problems but also to achieve goals (Hamber and Lewis, 1997). The 
Reverend Frank Chikane wrote in 1987 that ‘the most tragic reflection of [the] war 
situation in which South Africa finds itself is that it faces the years to come with 
children who have been socialised to find violence completely acceptable and human 
life cheap’ (Quoted in Mehlwana, 1996: 31). In the period before the un-banning of 
the ANC and the lifting of the state of emergency (February 1990) much of the 
conflict and violence was driven by township residents’ opposition to apartheid and 
their attempts to make the townships ungovernable. This included rent, services and 
consumer boycotts, worker stayaways, protest marches and mass mobilisation. The 
Government responded by imposing a state of emergency and clamped down on overt 
political activity, thus leading to confrontation between township residents and the 
security forces. The period leading up to democracy (1990-1994) was characterised 
by both inter and intra-community violence facilitated by the deregulation of the 
repressive state security forces and the legitimisation of violence by all political 
groupings prior to the 1990s (Hamber, 1998). In the democratic South Africa violence 
is endemic and can be found in almost all parts of social life including attacks against 
illegal aliens and xenophobia, campus violence, domestic violence, minibus taxi 
‘wars’ and violent crime (Minnaar et al, 1998). Thus the sjambokking of ‘skollies’ 
(local hoodlums) by organised groups such as Mapogo or the coming together of 
concerned community members like taxi-drivers or ex-combatants has become 
common place in the townships in the ‘new’ South Africa despite the State’s attempts 
to reform and legitimise the criminal justice system. 
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This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the meaning of violence is closely 
bound to its social context. Where that context has overt political and security 
manifestations, ways of understanding and dealing with violence are conditioned by, 
in this case, the failure of the formal police and justice systems to effectively tackle 
the problem. Hence, direct involvement by paramilitaries and vigilantes in addressing 
community crime is a legacy of failed political systems. The corollary, however, that 
a political settlement somehow changes the ways in which communities respond to 
crime cannot be assumed. Political settlements do not, of themselves, immediately 
impact on communal violence. New political dispensations must, over time, 
demonstrate that reformed policing and criminal justice systems have secured 
sufficient community confidence in their impartiality and efficacy so that these 
communities can give their allegiance to the very institutions of the state which they 
previously distrusted. In the short to medium term ‘tried and tested’ instant retributive 
‘justice’ meted out by paramiltaries and vigilantes will continue with community 
support and the glib descriptions ‘imperfect peace’ and ‘acceptable levels of violence’ 
will apply.    
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